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1 
Consumers respond to a model for (re)building consumer trust in the 1 
food system 2 
Abstract 3 
Researchers and food system actors have developed a best practice model to assist with (re)building 4 
or maintaining consumer trust in the food system in the event of a food incident. The aim of the 5 
present study was to determine how well the model aligns with consumer views of the strategies 6 
required to maintain consumer trust during and following a food incident. This qualitative public 7 
deliberation study employed experimental, developmental vignettes during 2 full-day sessions in 8 
May 2018. Following general discussion of the food incident scenario presented in the vignettes, 15 9 
South Australian adults (in two groups) developed a collated and ranked list of key strategies to be 10 
used by food system actors during a food incident to assist in maintaining consumer trust. 11 
Participants were then introduced to the existing model, and engaged in discussions about if and 12 
how their strategies aligned with those in the existing model. Findings demonstrate broad 13 
consistency between the two groups and the model in the strategies identified as key for 14 
(re)building and maintaining consumer trust during a food incident. For example, timely 15 
transparency was reported by consumers as the key strategy for maintaining consumer trust during 16 
and after a food incident. However, participants expressed pessimism regarding actors’ ability to 17 
implement strategies. Although minimal, differences were noted in strategy descriptions between 18 
the groups and the Model. This study suggests that overall the model is highly consistent with 19 
consumer views. If actors are to demonstrably apply the Model in the event of a food incident, our 20 
data suggest that the identified strategies will successfully assist them in (re)building and/or 21 
maintaining consumer trust in the food supply.   22 
Keywords 23 
Consumers, trust, food system, food incident, food regulator, food industry 24 
1. Introduction25 
Consumer trust is essential for the functioning of food systems globally. For consumers, trust is one 26 
pathway for reducing the complexity and uncertainty they are faced with in engaging with modern 27 
food systems (Bildtgard, 2008; Tonkin et al., 2016). The value of consumer trust to the market lies in 28 
its fundamental role in enabling food markets to function with the general support of the 29 
community, also known as social license (Arnot, 2011). Social license is maintained as long as public 30 
trust is maintained, and must be supported by expensive, inflexible and onerous regulatory structure 31 
when consumer trust is lost (Arnot, 2011). As such, the globalised food market is dependent on 32 
consumer trust in a foundational sense, as well as for its obvious importance for individual 33 
companies and brands. Further, because of their complexity, even with functional social license, 34 
globalised food systems require extensive regulation and critical oversight, and consumer trust 35 
legitimises the authority of governments to conduct these activities (Houghton et al., 2008; Wynne, 36 
2002) (see also Henderson et al. (2012); Meyer et al. (2012); Tonkin et al. (2015)). Threats to 37 
consumer trust can come from many sources, but food incidents, whether food safety incidents or 38 
food fraud cases (Spink & Moyer, 2011), present a major and ongoing challenge (Cope et al., 2010). 39 
Numerous high-profile food safety and fraud incidents have shaken consumer trust in food systems 40 
globally over the last two decades; for example melamine in milk in China, the horsemeat scandal 41 
across Europe, the plasticizer incident in Taiwan, food fraud in Brazil, the dioxin crisis in Ireland and 42 
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the notorious BSE crisis in the United Kingdom. The specific details of how these incidents came 43 
about and the resultant consumer purchasing behaviours and market outcomes have been highly 44 
publicised and amply studied (Dey & Montet, 2017; Jacob et al., 2011; Regan et al., 2015; Regan et 45 
al., 2016; Thomson et al., 2012; Xiu & Klein, 2010; Yamoah & Yawson, 2014). A lesser focus of this 46 
literature however is consumer perspectives of strategies for the management and repair of their 47 
trust in the fallout from these incidents. Barnett et al. (2016) report that in the wake of the 48 
horsemeat food fraud incident across Europe, consumers described needing tougher penalties for 49 
fraudsters, more information and transparency, as well as shorter food chains and improved use of 50 
food labels to rebuild their confidence in meat products, and therefore reinstate previous 51 
purchasing behaviour. While these are useful practical suggestions, this literature in general lacks a 52 
comprehensive and systematic examination of consumer opinion regarding how food system actors 53 
can (re)build or maintain consumer trust following food incidents more broadly.  54 
Wilson et al. (2016) previously published an evidence-based best practice model for (re)building and 55 
maintaining consumer trust in the food supply before, during and after food incidents (hereafter ‘the 56 
Model’). The Model was developed through eliciting the views of 105 food system actors including 57 
food industry, food regulatory and media actors from the United Kingdom, Australia and New 58 
Zealand regarding the strategies they saw as important for managing consumer trust around a food 59 
incident. Fifty-eight participants went on to participate in a member-checking and strategy ranking 60 
exercise. The Model centres on 10 strategies identified by the participants, including: (1) be 61 
transparent, (2) have protocols and procedures in place, (3) be credible (4) be proactive, (5) put 62 
consumers first, (6) collaborate with stakeholders, (7) be consistent, (8) educate stakeholders and 63 
consumers, (9) build your reputation and (10) keep your promises. The Model includes a description 64 
for how each of the 10 strategies should be implemented by media, food industry and regulators. 65 
Although the Model is thought to be best practice by food system actors in the regions studied and 66 
has also been supported in international comparison studies, no consumer input into the Model has 67 
occurred to date. The aim of the present study was to address the lack of consumer-led direction for 68 
strategies to (re)build and maintain consumer trust during and following a food incident by both 69 
eliciting consumer strategies and determining how well the Model aligns with consumer views. The 70 
objectives therefore were to (1) determine the strategies consumers see as important to support 71 
their trust in the management of a food incident, and (2) critique the Model using these. 72 
2. Methods 73 
2.1. Study design 74 
This qualitative public deliberation study involved consumers participating in a full day (6.5 hours) of 75 
structured democratic deliberation grouped within morning and afternoon sessions (Figure 1), in 76 
May 2018. Participants and the research team were together throughout the day, including sharing 77 
meals, morning and afternoon refreshment breaks. This immersive and intense approach is required 78 
for participants to become acquainted and comfortable with each other, the content, the process of 79 
a public deliberation and the researchers (Degeling et al., 2015; O'Doherty et al., 2012; Thomas et 80 
al., 2017).  81 
The morning vignette discussion session (Figure 1) involved participants being presented with 82 
experimental, developmental vignettes for group discussion. Vignettes are narrative scenarios 83 
presented to research participants to contextualise their responses in a research study (Grønhøj & 84 
Bech-Larsen, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2010). They unfolded in a series of 3 stages, providing further 85 
information and context about the scenarios as the morning progressed. Vignettes were used here 86 
to situate the deliberations within a food incident scenario, and orient participants to previous food 87 
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incidents they had personally experienced. Participants were organised into two groups that 88 
conducted the day’s activities concurrently in separate rooms to enable the presentation of two 89 
different vignettes (further described in ‘Data collection’). Experimental manipulation of the details 90 
of vignettes is commonly used to determine the impact on the social behaviours described by 91 
participants (Grønhøj & Bech-Larsen, 2010), and was used here to explore whether different and 92 
contrasting food incident conditions impacted the key strategies thought by participants to support 93 
consumer trust in the food system during a food incident. The first session culminated in participants 94 
achieving consensus on a collated and ranked list of key strategies to be used by food system actors 95 
during a food incident to assist in maintaining consumer trust. This was done in order to preserve 96 
the power of the participants to constitute and elucidate their own strategies, rather than have 97 
researchers determine these after the fact based on transcripts. This is of central importance to the 98 
democratic method employed (Degeling et al., 2015; O'Doherty et al., 2012; Thomas et al., 2017). In 99 
the Model discussion session, participants were introduced to the Model developed by Wilson et al. 100 
(2016) mentioned above. Afternoon deliberations then focused on comparing the ranked lists of 101 
strategies developed in the morning session with, and critiquing, the Model.  102 
_________________________________________________________ 103 
Insert: Figure 1. Study components in chronological order about here 104 
_________________________________________________________ 105 
2.2. Data collection 106 
The two food incident vignettes comprised three stages (Appendix A). Each outlined a series of 107 
events relating to a food safety incident involving black pepper, and were structured as follows: a 108 
vague introduction to the incident, a second part with extensive detail about the responses of food 109 
system actors, and a third part describing the resolution of the food incident. Group 1 received a 110 
vignette where the actions of the organisations named in the scenario were based on the Model; 111 
that is, the Group 1 vignette outlined a food incident where all food system actors conducted a ‘best 112 
practice’ response according to the Model. In the Group 2 vignette, food system actors behaved in 113 
the opposite way; that is, their response was the opposite of best practice according to the Model. 114 
The vignettes were developed by the research team in collaboration with a food regulatory agency 115 
to ensure both vignettes were realistic. Contaminated black pepper was chosen for the vignettes 116 
because it is widely consumed in the Australian community as an ingredient in many food products 117 
and at the table-top. Consumers from a wide diversity of cultural, religious and socio-economic 118 
groups eat black pepper making it relevant to all study participants. 119 
All deliberations were facilitated by the same senior researcher for each group (JC and PW). This 120 
involved guiding the groups’ discussion toward the study areas of interest, detailing instructions for 121 
the group tasks, as well as ensuring inclusive group dynamics made possible by the immersive 122 
environment. During the vignette deliberation session participants were presented with each stage 123 
of the vignette and asked to discuss their feelings and response in terms of who they would be 124 
looking to for information, and what information they would be seeking, their expectations of the 125 
people they identify as part of the management of the incident, as well as their own consumer 126 
behaviour in relation to the incident (see discussion schedule in Appendix A). Participants were then 127 
asked to individually write down on Post-It notes the actions/expectations (strategies) of food 128 
system actors they saw as most important to help maintain their trust given the food incident 129 
scenario. Strategies on Post-It notes were collated into similar concepts by the researchers during 130 
the morning tea break, and this was conducted in the same room and in full view of the participants. 131 
Each group then reviewed, debated and revised these groupings, and gave each concept group a 132 
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name agreed upon as representative by the group (for example, ‘transparency’). Finally, the 133 
concepts were then explicitly defined and ranked in order of importance. There was no limit placed 134 
on the number of strategies. Thus at the end of the vignette discussion session both groups had a 135 
ranked list of key strategies for food system actors during a food incident to support consumer trust, 136 
in the same format as that in the Model.  137 
The Model discussion session began with a comprehensive presentation of the Model from the 138 
researcher co-ordinating its development (AW). This presentation was intentionally left until after 139 
the participants had developed their own ranked list of key strategies so as not to influence 140 
participants’ responses. Preserving the original two groups, through facilitated deliberation 141 
participants then compared the 10 strategies within the Model with their own ranked list by merging 142 
strategies they considered similar under the same heading (hereafter we refer to this process as 143 
‘mapping’). Put simply, they matched strategies they thought generally had the same meaning. For 144 
example, Group 1 had a strategy they called ‘openness and transparency’ which they considered 145 
closely matched in meaning and scope the ‘be transparent’ strategy from the Model, and therefore 146 
mapped ‘openness and transparency’ to ‘be transparent’ (in Table 2 this is graphically presented 147 
using a solid line connecting the strategies from each list, presented below). Similarly, Group 2 148 
concluded that taken together their two strategies of ‘independent oversight’ and ‘information’ had 149 
similar intent and actions to the Model strategy of ‘be credible’, therefore mapped these. Any 150 
strategies that were not mapped to the Model, or widely differing descriptions of mapped 151 
strategies, were then discussed in terms of a critique of the Model. 152 
2.3. Sampling and recruitment 153 
Participants were recruited using purposive, theoretical, stratified sampling through a market 154 
research company. This method prioritises sampling that reflects the diversity of the population of 155 
interest, rather than representativeness (Barbour, 2007), which is appropriate for deliberative 156 
democratic methods (O’Doherty, 2017). Adults older than 18 years from Adelaide, South Australia 157 
were invited to participate from a database of approximately 20,000 respondents. Stratification was 158 
used to ensure balanced sampling of a number of factors known to impact trust in the food system 159 
including: food market preferences (supermarket shoppers, organic/specialty store shoppers, 160 
farmer’s market/own produce shoppers) (Ekici, 2004; Tonkin et al., 2016), age, gender, 161 
socioeconomic status (by suburb), country of birth (Australia/international), occupation and 162 
household makeup (single no children, couple no children in home, family with children under/over 163 
12) (Henderson et al., 2011; Holmberg et al., 2010; Poppe & Kjaernes, 2003; A. Taylor et al., 2012; A. 164 
W. Taylor et al., 2012). Additional recruitment was conducted at an organic market using flyers to 165 
fulfil unmet sampling dimensions. Participants were placed into two groups for the day’s activities 166 
using the same sampling dimensions, as having two groups with similar participant composition is 167 
thought to ensure data features are not simply those of a one-off group (Barbour, 2007; Scott & 168 
Garner, 2013). Additionally, having participants with different opinions in the group, and thus some 169 
disagreement in discussion, typically encourages participants to provide depth in their justification 170 
for their opinions enabling greater clarity on their perspectives (Barbour, 2007). All participants 171 
provided informed consent and were reimbursed $100 for expenses associated with participating. 172 
The recruitment target for this study was 16 participants, 8 per group, as this is generally considered 173 
the maximum number of participants for a group while still enabling depth in data collection and 174 
analysis (Barbour, 2007; Scott & Garner, 2013). Ethics approval was granted by the Flinders 175 
University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee (SBREC7567).  176 
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2.4. Analysis 177 
All materials resulting from the day’s activities were used in the analysis, including: audio recordings 178 
of all group discussions, transcribed verbatim; each group’s ranked list of strategies; the butchers 179 
paper groupings of each individual participant’s identified strategies; and the researchers’ own notes 180 
from the day. Analysis initially focused on comparing the outputs from each group (the ranked list of 181 
strategies and description of each strategy) with the Model to determine how well it aligned with 182 
consumer views. The first part of this comparison was of course part of data collection, and 183 
therefore participant led. However, the Model presented to participants was not in ranked order of 184 
importance. Therefore, to enable comparisons of strategy rank, the Model strategies were ranked in 185 
order of the ‘average ranking following a food incident’ approach used in the original paper, and 186 
where scores were the same, they were ordered based on highest percentage agreement (Table 2, 187 
p7, Wilson et al., 2016). This method of ranking the Model strategies was chosen as it most closely 188 
matched what participants in the present study were asked to do during deliberations. Similarities 189 
and differences were identified, and transcripts and researcher notes were then interrogated to 190 
draw out further context for, and any implications of, inconsistencies. Transcripts were also openly 191 
coded to accommodate any additional themes raised by consumers which were not captured in the 192 
final outputs. The method of data collection enabled the participants themselves to map and 193 
compare their strategies to those of the Model, therefore the results presented here were 194 
thoroughly participant led and their presentation member-checked by participants, ensuring 195 
credibility and authenticity (Nicholls, 2009).  196 
3. Results 197 
3.1. Participant characteristics 198 
Fourteen of the 15 participants recruited through the market research company, and one additional 199 
participant from the organic market recruitment attended both deliberation sessions on the day 200 
(Table 1). 201 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 202 
Insert Table 1. Characteristics of participants attending all sessions of the study, by group here 203 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 204 
3.2. Participants’ overall response to the vignettes 205 
In their response to vignette part 1 which opened the group deliberations, Groups 1 and 2 identified 206 
industry (growers, suppliers, manufacturers, retailers and food outlets such as restaurants), 207 
regulators (generally termed ‘the health department’, ‘SA health’ or ‘Food Standards Australia’) and 208 
the media as key actors in a food incident, prior to any mention of these actors from researchers. In 209 
addition, participants in Group 1 thought hospitals were an important stakeholder in identifying the 210 
cause of the food incident.  211 
It was clear from participants’ responses to the complete vignettes that the two vignettes elicited 212 
different trust reactions from the participants. The vignette based on the Model was highly 213 
consistent with consumer expectations, while the other vignette violated these expectations. For 214 
example, a Group 1 (best-practice scenario) participant in response to vignette part 2 said, 215 
I think what has happened is what should happen. It’s pretty consistent in terms 216 
of what needs to be provided. (Michael) 217 
While a Group 2 (non-best-practice scenario) participant response to vignette part 2 was, 218 
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But I’m serious, if we are taking the whole scenario as one thing there are a lot of 219 
conflicting issues which would bring about distrust in the company…And then I’ll 220 
blame [government organisation] because they should be testing before it’s 221 
brought to the consumers. So it means there’s something that the government 222 
didn't do, there’s a step that wasn't followed. So for me if you take the whole 223 
statement, the scenario on the whole I would basically think about sacking my 224 
pepper. (Andrew) 225 
3.3. Consumers’ ranked strategies mapped to the Model 226 
Participants identified the key actions or expectations of food system actors they felt would be 227 
required for their trust to be maintained in the event of a food incident, gave them a single name 228 
(hereafter referred to as ‘strategy’), ranked their listed strategies, and mapped them to the Model. 229 
Each ranked list is shown in Table 2, as well as how the participants mapped their strategies to the 230 
Model.   231 
_____________________ 232 
Insert Table 2 about here 233 
_____________________ 234 
Transparency was independently ranked the number 1 strategy by Groups 1 and 2, and in the 235 
Model. Both Groups 1 and 2 also saw some repetition in the Model strategies of ‘be credible’ and 236 
‘build your reputation’. Eight of the 11 strategies identified by Group 1 (best practice vignette) were 237 
thought by participants to be captured within the top 5 strategies of the Model (Table 2). The 238 
strategies ‘be transparent’, ‘be credible’ and ‘have protocols and procedures in place’ mapped 239 
directly to Group 1 strategies that participants felt were equivalent and also ranked in the same 240 
position. All of the 10 strategies identified by Group 2 (‘non-best practice’ vignette) were thought by 241 
participants to be captured within the top 5 strategies of the Model (Table 2Table 2). The strategies 242 
‘be transparent’, ‘be credible’ and ‘put consumers first’ mapped directly to Group 2 strategies that 243 
participants felt were equivalent and also ranked in the same position. Therefore, the top 5 244 
strategies within the Model were thought by participants to capture 8/11 (Group 1) and 10/10 245 
(Group 2) strategies they independently identified as important for (re)building or maintaining 246 
consumer trust in the food system in the event of a food incident, with many strategies mapping 247 
directly to equivalently ranked strategies within the Model.  248 
3.4. Consumers’ detailed critique of the description of the Model strategies 249 
3.4.1. Be transparent 250 
Group 1 mapped their strategy ‘Openness and transparency’ and Group 2 mapped ‘Transparency’ to 251 
the Model’s ‘Be transparent’ (Table 2Table 2). The Model and both Groups 1 and 2 defined these 252 
strategies as transparency in food system actor actions in investigating and managing a food 253 
incident. Both Groups 1 and 2 expanded the definition of transparency provided in the Model 254 
however, particularly in relation to the media. Consumers emphasised the need for accuracy in all 255 
aspects of reporting, and Group 2 intertwined being transparent with being proactive for the media,  256 
That’s my point, being transparent doesn’t just mean whatever someone hands it 257 
over you just accept it and pass it on. You have to do your own research and 258 
whatever you find out you give to the public and that means transparency. 259 
(Andrew) 260 
Consumers were also sceptical as to whether industry ‘know what consumers mean by 261 
transparency…full disclosure’ (Group 2 ranking table) including honesty about vested interests and 262 
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processes involved for industry when managing a food incident (for example cost-benefit analyses 263 
for recalls).  264 
I’d want to see information that said we have consulted our lawyers and our 265 
economists and our whatsit and we have formed this view. (Simon) 266 
Both groups also discussed transparency in relation to regulatory documents detailing procedures 267 
and protocols for food incidents being freely and easily accessible. Finally, Group 1 were also seeking 268 
transparency from point-of-sale retailers, 269 
I think where you purchased that produce from has a responsibility to tell you 270 
[about food incidents]…But they probably don’t want to do that because then 271 
people are going to do exactly what I did, “Oh, I might not eat rockmelon this 272 
week,” and then they lose money too. (Jemima) 273 
3.4.2. Be proactive 274 
Group 1 mapped their two strategies ‘Information’ and ‘Taking responsibility’, and Group 2 mapped 275 
‘Communicating during the incident’ and ‘Expect companies to take responsibility and fix the issue’ 276 
to the Model’s ‘Be Proactive’ (Table 2Table 2). For both Groups 1 and 2 being proactive meant all 277 
food system actors providing information about a food incident to consumers quickly and in full. 278 
Both groups specifically stated this needed to include information about the symptoms of the illness 279 
caused by the food. This represented a narrower description for the media and regulators, and a 280 
slightly expanded description for industry compared to that presented in the Model. A critical part of 281 
being proactive as seen by consumers was that food industry take responsibility for the incident, and 282 
industry and regulators describe why it occurred, and how it will be prevented in future.  283 
I think – just to follow what you just said there should be more proactive in that, 284 
that the one who are bringing out the communication, I would like if such an 285 
incident happened, I’d like maybe six months from now, the government come 286 
out and say ‘we actually have done this and this and this’, not just put it in a 287 
report somewhere…. (Andrew) 288 
It was important to consumers that industry should not wait to be ‘found out’ by the media, but take 289 
initiative and voluntarily come forward to communicate all facets of the incident with consumers,  290 
I do think, like using the Garibaldi example, because they were very actively 291 
involved in that and they seemed to be very open and very honest about what 292 
was going on, and I think that was an excellent response on their part. They knew 293 
the damage that was happening, but they dealt with that. (Michael) 294 
Finally, Group 2 identified that one-way regulators could be proactive was informing consumers 295 
about existing food regulation and how it operates,  296 
I think that as a proactive way, ‘cause you’re going to have the regulation, but if 297 
the governments are actually doing what they’re doing and they’re showing us 298 
that’s a proactive way of us accepting that they’re actually doing what they’re 299 
saying. (Andrew) 300 
3.4.3. Be credible 301 
Group 1 mapped their strategies ‘Statements from relevant health governing body’ and 302 
‘Information’, and Group 2 mapped ‘Independent oversight’ and ‘Information’ to the Model’s ‘Be 303 
Credible’ (Table 2Table 2). With a greater focus on the type of information provided than in the 304 
description in the Model, both Groups 1 and 2 related the ‘be credible’ strategy to their own 305 
strategies about providing ‘accurate, reliable, testable, easier to access, timely’ (Group 2 strategy list 306 
document) and ‘evidence based…plain and simple’ (Group 1 strategy list document) information to 307 
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consumers during a food incident. Importantly, and consistent with the Model, both groups also 308 
identified the need for information to be either validated or provided by a trusted, independent 309 
body, providing examples like chief medical officers or hospitals. Group 2 specifically identified ‘not 310 
just the media/industry/regulators’ (Group 2 strategy list document), while SA Health were seen as a 311 
credible organisation for Group 1. Not only did an independent body need to be involved in 312 
communication, but in all parts of the incident investigation and management, 313 
Jemima: Because they have a business and if they can make another 314 
shortcut around it or make it not look as bad as it truly is, I think there’s someone 315 
else that needs to be the voice of reason in there. 316 
Brenda: Independent. 317 
Both groups also emphasised the importance of the timeline of the incident and when information is 318 
provided to consumers impacting on the credibility of organisations involved, 319 
And if this is happening 48 hours after the initial report well understandably we 320 
don't have enough information but if this is a month down the track it’s like ‘hang 321 
on a second, SA Health you’re not doing your job’.  So it’s a time thing. (Peter) 322 
3.4.4. Put consumers first 323 
Group 1 mapped their strategy ‘Recall’, and Group 2 mapped ‘Consumer education and critical 324 
awareness’ to the Model’s ‘Put consumers first’ (Table 2Table 2). For both Groups 1 and 2 food 325 
system actors could demonstrate that consumers are the priority by implementing the earlier 326 
strategies as defined by them; that is, by providing timely, consistent and comprehensive 327 
information regardless of its impact on reputation.  328 
Conservative actions that may result in loss of income/reputation for industry were also mentioned 329 
by both groups, such as early recalls and ‘naming and shaming’ industry performing poorly in routine 330 
regulatory investigations.  331 
Aaron: Yeah. And I suppose I’d expect them to be conservative, that it’s 332 
better that they throw away twice as much food then perhaps was necessary. 333 
Shane: More than needed, yeah. 334 
Aaron: Rather than have people get sick, type of thing. 335 
3.4.5. Have protocols and procedures in place 336 
Group 1 mapped their three strategies ‘Investigation’, ‘Systems in place’ and ‘Evaluation’, and Group 337 
2 mapped their four strategies ‘Testing’, ‘Action in the wake of an incident’, ‘Protocols/procedures in 338 
place’ and ‘Identifying the source of the incident’ to the Model’s ‘Have protocols and procedures in 339 
place’ (Table 2Table 2). This strategy was considered by both Groups 1 and 2 to encompass the 340 
investigation of the incident (testing, how it occurred), as well as protocols and procedures for 341 
communicating responses to the incident during and once resolved. Importantly, both groups 342 
emphasised the need for a demonstrably systematic process in all parts of incident management and 343 
including options for punitive actions taken in the wake (with an expectation of severe penalties for 344 
industry found to be deliberately risking public health).  345 
Both groups reported that simply knowing that food incident protocols existed and could rapidly be 346 
implemented would impact positively on trust in the food system, 347 
I like the idea that there is a food incident protocol. I’ve never considered what 348 
that would be, but I assumed that there would be something like that. It’s good to 349 
know that there is, and it seems to have a name. (Mark) 350 
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For Groups 1 and 2 this strategy incorporated both having protocols to prevent food incidents, as 351 
well as those to action systematic investigation of, and responses to, food incidents when they 352 
occur, which overall is consistent with the definition provided in the Model. 353 
3.4.6. Collaborate with stakeholders and be consistent 354 
Group 1 mapped their strategy ‘Independent oversight’ to the Model’s ‘Collaborate with 355 
stakeholders’ and ‘Be consistent’, while Group 2 did not feel any of their strategies were like these. 356 
On face value, both Groups 1 and 2 had reservations about the inclusion of ‘Collaborate with 357 
stakeholders’ in the Model. Both groups deliberated at length about whether there is a need for 358 
relationships between food industry, the media and regulators, and how knowledge of these 359 
relationships might impact both their trust in the food system generally, as well as information 360 
received by the public during a food incident. Group 1 ultimately saw their strategies as being 361 
implemented together and in the sense that a range of stakeholders should work together to 362 
provide consistent information and to the goal of completing the investigation of a food incident 363 
quickly; that is, all stakeholders are involved in ensuring information is accurate and all stakeholders 364 
commenting on the incident provide consistent information for consumers to consider when 365 
choosing their own actions in response to the incident,  366 
Because I follow social media and all that, SA Health brought out a statement 367 
saying that it’s been cleared. Woolworths had a sign saying that these rock 368 
melons have been cleared, you can eat them. And what was the other one? There 369 
was another association that said, yes, you can eat it, as well. (Penny) 370 
This was also discussed as consistency in how separate food incidents are managed, even to the 371 
point of having a standard location for and presentation of advertised announcements about food 372 
incidents. Although not explicitly stated, much of the conversation from Group 2 members in 373 
response to vignette Part 2 revolved around the consistency between public statements and 374 
organisation’s actions, as well as the consistency of information between actors. This description is 375 
highly consistent with the definitions provided in the Model. As previously mentioned, both groups 376 
raised concerns regarding vested interests in food regulation, and therefore explicitly expressed this 377 
strategy would only support consumer trust if there was transparency about food system 378 
interrelationships, and also that the media was exclusively independent of these. 379 
3.4.7. Keep your promises 380 
Neither group explicitly identified ‘keep your promises’ as a key strategy, primarily because they 381 
thought it was implied by the strategies previously discussed. It was however identified as of critical 382 
importance for actors to be considered trustworthy; 383 
Facilitator:  What would that look like if you were to think, so in my head an 384 
untrustworthy person would exhibit these behaviours or an untrustworthy 385 
organisation would exhibit these behaviours?  What would that look like to be 386 
untrustworthy? 387 
Clarise:  Not following through on promises. 388 
3.4.8. Educate stakeholders and/or consumers 389 
Group 1 mapped their strategies ‘Information’ and ‘Systems/protocols in place’, and Group 2 390 
mapped ‘Consumer education and critical awareness’ to the Model’s ‘Educate stakeholders and/or 391 
consumers’. While generally finding their definition similar to that of the Model, Group 1 thought 392 
the implementation of this strategy should be extended to also making consumers aware of the 393 
protocols and procedures that exist in terms of how food is regulated during both business-as-usual, 394 
and during a food incident;  395 
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Facilitator: So if I’m going to put that into the language that we’ve been 396 
playing with here, would it say something like, “I would have more trust in food 397 
supply if I had a better understanding of the food system.”? 398 
Michael: Yeah. 399 
Facilitator: Is that, you know, not just the incident itself, but the food system. 400 
Michael: Yes. 401 
Jemima: Yeah. 402 
Brenda: And my responsibilities when interacting with the food system. 403 
Group 2 defined this strategy quite differently to both the Model and Group 1, focussing on food 404 
system actors facilitating consumers to educate themselves and develop a critical awareness of food 405 
matters, 406 
When you're talking about educating stakeholders and consumers, do you think 407 
the five basic points [referring to the Top 5 ranked Model strategies], if you don't 408 
educate them, then the other five become null and void because you can set up 409 
the protocols and the procedures, but if the consumers don't actually know how 410 
to go about them, how to get - how to put on their views, how to bring it out to 411 
the regulatory bodies, how are they supposed to actually - how are they supposed 412 
to complain or do anything? (Andrew) 413 
3.4.9. Build your reputation 414 
Group 1 mapped their three strategies ‘Statements from relevant health governing body’, 415 
‘Independent oversight’ and ‘Action in the wake of an incident’, and Group 2 mapped their strategy 416 
‘Independent oversight’ to the Model’s ‘Build your reputation’. Both Groups 1 and 2 linked this to 417 
the previously mentioned strategies within ‘be credible’, citing that implementing all other strategies 418 
fully would assist in building a reputation for being trustworthy. The definition provided in the 419 
Model also heavily features themes around credibility. Both Groups 1 and 2 also discussed ‘build 420 
your reputation’ as industry and regulators clearly communicating remedial or punitive actions taken 421 
in the wake of a food incident.  422 
4. Discussion 423 
Our data strongly supports the conclusion that timely transparency is the key strategy for 424 
maintaining consumer trust during and after a food incident. The other strategies identified by the 425 
participants were also highly consistent with the Model developed by Wilson et al. (2016); eight of 426 
the eleven strategies from Group 1, and all 10 Group 2 strategies were mapped by the participants 427 
to the top five ranked Model strategies. Therefore, the Model in its current form is fundamentally 428 
supported by consumer opinion. Despite the groups receiving very different vignettes to 429 
contextualise their deliberations and having different trust reactions to these, the findings 430 
demonstrate broad consistency between groups and with the Model in the descriptions of the 431 
strategies they identified as key for maintaining consumer trust during a food incident, albeit with 432 
some differences in emphasis. This suggests that different food incident conditions do not appear to 433 
affect the types of strategies thought to be beneficial by consumers to (re)build or maintain their 434 
trust during, and following a food incident 435 
The value placed by consumers on timely transparency and its importance during a food incident 436 
found here echoes that reported by Barnett et al. (2016) in their study of consumer responses to the 437 
horsemeat scandal in the UK. Participants in both studies also suggested tougher penalties and 438 
accountability, and greater information sharing with consumers to be strategies supporting 439 
consumer trust (Barnett et al., 2016). These strategies, and many others identified by participants in 440 
the present study, are congruous with best-practice risk communication literature. For example, in 441 
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their ‘core risk communication strategy’ Charlebois and Summan (2015) include openness, 442 
transparency, independence, and timeliness/responsiveness as key. This importantly includes 443 
transparency and timely communication with consumers in circumstances of uncertainty as stressed 444 
by both participants in the present study and risk communication literature (Barnett et al., 2016; 445 
Charlebois & Summan, 2015; Cope et al., 2010; van Kleef et al., 2009). These findings support 446 
literature suggesting consumers appear to be willing to tolerate uncertainty about risk if it is 447 
presented transparently and is the most up-to-date information available at the time. However, if 448 
inappropriate food system relationships prevent the public receiving full and accurate, and timely 449 
information, consumer trust will be jeopardised (McGloin et al., 2009). Timeliness can be seen from 450 
the findings to permeate many of the strategies, most especially be proactive, transparent and 451 
credible. The same information delivered at different time points was suggested by these 452 
participants to have very different impacts on consumer trust and perceived credibility of system 453 
actors. As such, food system actors would do well to incorporate in food incident management plans 454 
communication strategies prioritising rapid and transparent communication about what is known 455 
about the incident at any timepoint based on best practice risk communication literature. 456 
There was a very high degree of consistency in the strategies and descriptions of strategies provided 457 
by consumers and the Model, and therefore perhaps the implication is actors need to demonstrably 458 
carry out the strategies. Like others (Cope et al., 2010; van Kleef et al., 2009), our data shows 459 
participants to be sceptical of food system actors’ intention in the case of industry and media, or 460 
capacity in the case of regulators, to carry out the strategies, due to inevitable competing priorities 461 
and pressures in their work. However, many of the strategies participants were sceptical about are 462 
already being carried out in Australia unbeknownst to these participants. While the problem of 463 
consumers’ sensitivity to industry interests impacting policy and regulation is potentially intractable, 464 
perhaps communicating more effectively, more broadly, and with more depth about how food 465 
regulation works during business-as-usual and during a food incident, with an emphasis on simple 466 
explanations of what regulation exists and how it can be applied, may assist in providing the 467 
education requested by participants in the present study, and therefore in setting realistic consumer 468 
expectations. Similar to these findings, Cope et al. (2010) report consumers seeking information 469 
about the operationalisation of risk in food systems, and Barnett et al. (2016) that consumers seek 470 
tougher penalties and accountability for industry. In communicating about a food incident therefore, 471 
emphasising the existence of pre-planned protocols, the systematic nature of the investigative 472 
process and incident management plan, the steps that will be taken to resolve the matter and what 473 
corrective action is possible is likely to instil public confidence and trust. Indeed our data suggest in 474 
some cases a specific incident does not necessarily result in diminution of trust in the system, but 475 
may well provide an opportunity to demonstrate the preparedness of the system, potentially 476 
contributing to the maintenance of trust in the system overall. 477 
The novel method employed in this study sets it apart from previous literature in the area as it 478 
reports true deliberative democratic public opinion; the immersive nature of the process allowed full 479 
participation and engagement. As O’Doherty (2017) states, there is ‘no meaningful theoretical 480 
foundation for the construct of public opinion as it is typically measured in surveys, polls, or focus 481 
groups’, with true public opinion elicited through deliberative democratic methods. This study 482 
therefore provides data representing genuine public opinion from which the recommendations for 483 
practice have been drawn. While there were fewer participants under the age of 30 who attended 484 
on the day than were recruited, those present were actively drawn into the deliberations by the 485 
facilitators, and the member checking inherent in the design of the study provides further 486 
confidence in the findings. This method of public deliberation could feasibly have numerous 487 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
12 
 
applications, including using similar ranking procedures for research priority setting in areas 488 
involving experts as well as consumer groups. 489 
5. Conclusion 490 
We found that public opinion was consistent with the best practice model for food system actors to 491 
use in the event of a food incident to assist with (re)building or maintaining consumer trust (the 492 
Model) proposed by Wilson et al. (2016). If food system actors are to demonstrably carry out the 493 
Model in the event of a food incident, these actions are consistent with those consumers state will 494 
support the maintenance of consumer trust in the food supply. This study could be repeated in other 495 
regions to determine whether the Model is transferrable. The next step in this work in Australia is to 496 
determine whether food system actors do carry out their practice in line with the Model, both 497 
during a food incident and business-as-usual, and whether this does indeed support consumer trust 498 
in the food system. 499 
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Table 1. Characteristics of participants attending all sessions of the study, by group 601 
Pseudonym Gender Age Market 
preference 
Country of 
birth 
Household makeup 
Group 1, 8 participants 
Shane Male  30-34 Supermarket  Australia Family, child <12 
Aaron Male 55-59 Supermarket Australia Family, child >12 
Penny Female 18-24 Supermarket Australia Single, no children 
Brenda Female 65+ Organic/Specialty Australia Couple, adult child 
Mark Male 30-34 Organic/Specialty Australia Couple, no children 
Athira Female 40-44 Farmer’s markets International Single, no children 
Michael Male 65+ Farmer’s markets International Couple, adult child 
Jemima Female 30-34 Farmer’s markets Australia Family, child <12 
Group 2, 7 participants 
Peter Male 45-49 Supermarket Australia Family, child <12 
Janice Female 45-49 Supermarket Australia Family, child >12 
Simon Male 65+ Organic/Specialty Australia Couple, adult child 
Clarise Female 40-44 Organic/Specialty Australia Family, child <12 
Marie Female 65+ Farmer’s markets International Couple, adult child 
Andrew Male 30-34 Farmer’s markets International Single, no children 
Rebecca Female 25-30 Farmer’s markets International Family, child <12 
 602 
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Table 2. The strategies required to be actioned by food system actors to ensure consumer trust is maintained during and after a food incident determined 603 
by Groups 1 and 2. Strategies are presented in the order of importance identified by participants (1 = most important). Participants’ mapping of their 604 
strategies to the original top-5 ranked strategies proposed by food system actors in the Model is represented by connecting lines. 605 
Group 1 strategies  ‘The Model’ strategies  Group 2 strategies 
1. Openness and transparency  1. Be transparent  1. Transparency 
2. Statements from relevant 
local health governing body 
 
2. Be Proactive 
 
2. Testing 
3. Information 
 
3. Be credible 
 3. Independent oversight 
4. Investigation 
 
4. Put consumers first 
 4. Consumer education and 
critical awareness 
5. Systems in place 
 5. Have protocols and 
procedures in place 
 
5. Information 
6. Recall 
 6. Collaborate with 
stakeholders 
 6. Communicating responses 
to the incident 
7. Independent oversight 
 
7. Keep your promises 
 7. Communicating during the 
incident 
8. Action in the wake of an 
incident 
 
8. Be Consistent 
 8. Protocols/procedures in 
place 
9. Time passing without 
incident 
 9. Educate stakeholders 
and/or consumers 
 9. Identifying the source of the 
incident 
10. Evaluation  
10. Build your reputation 
 10. Expect companies to take 
responsibility and fix the issue 11. Taking responsibility   
 606 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Appendix A 
Group 1 vignette and question schedule 
 
Part 1 
‘You see a news report in SA in the past week that three people have been hospitalised from an 
illness associated we think with consuming pepper.’ 
Questions and prompts: 
1. Given this session is about trust, what does trust look like to you? 
2. What questions would you have about the incident? What would you want to know? 
3. Where would you expect to find out more information about this? Who would you be  
looking to for details? 
4. Who are you thinking should be involved in managing this incident? (Both communicating 
with the public and making sure the contaminated foods are eliminated) 
5. What types of things would you be expecting these people to do, if they were to do the right 
thing?  
6. What would you personally be doing to manage the risk, if anything? 
7. What do you think the best possible outcome for you personally would be?  
a. If this was managed successfully, what would you be doing in response? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Part 2  
•  ‘SA Health states the illness is salmonella, and confirms the Food Incident Protocol has been 
initiated.  
• The Chief Medical Officer, Director of Public Health, and food safety information council 
make statements to the media about testing being done on pepper sauces to identify the 
source of the salmonella, and that more information will be released as it is available.  
• SA Health make a statement that the Imported Food Association has worked with them to 
proactively trace distribution chains and the country of origin of the potentially 
contaminated pepper.  
• Industry has stated they will voluntarily recall affected products.  
• Regular updates are given on the number of cases reported to hospital, patient recovery 
outcomes, and incident management actions by the same spokesperson from each 
organisation.  
• Information is clear and easily understood, released via TV news, radio, newspapers, and 
online.  
• Previous incidents have been managed well by the companies involved.  
• An incident hotline for consumer questions is set up and incident fact sheets are provided and 
updated.’ 
Questions and prompts: 
1. Let’s summarise what’s happened. 
2. How do you feel about what is happening now? 
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3. Is there anything more you would want in terms of the management of this situation? 
a. Is there anything else you would like to know? 
4. What would you personally be doing to manage the risk, if anything? 
5. What would it take for you to feel comfortable eating the affected foods again? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Part 3 
‘One month later the number of hospitalisations is confirmed to be 25 people, all of the relevant food 
products are identified and recalled, the source is traced and is no longer imported, and  it is 
confirmed that domestic product is not involved.’ 
Questions and prompts: 
1. Let’s summarise what’s happened. 
2. How do you feel about what is happening now? 
3. Is there anything more you would want in terms of the management of this situation? 
a. Is there anything else you would like to know? 
4. What would you personally be doing to manage the risk, if anything? 
5. What would it take for you to feel comfortable eating the affected foods again? 
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Group 2 vignette 
 
Part 1 
‘You see a news report in SA in the past week that three people have been hospitalised from an 
illness associated we think with consuming pepper.’ 
Questions and prompts: 
See Group 1 above. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Part 2 
• ‘There is a delay in SA Health making a statement and they cannot officially confirm what the 
illness is, saying “We are not sure what the cause is and we are still investigating”.  
• The media reports industry have taken no action as they await test results.  
• The media reports that industry are saying they do not believe that pepper is the source of 
the problem, and companies release statements saying their products are not involved.  
• Different spokespeople provide information, and industry and health departments issue 
conflicting information about which products are being recalled in SA, Vic and NSW.  
• The information released provides lots of technical information about the testing done, but 
no key messages and is released through radio and newspapers.  
• Previous incidents have been managed poorly by the companies involved.  
• Information only becomes available irregularly, and statements are not followed up.  
• There is no central consumer hotline for questions. 
Questions and prompts: 
See Group 1 above.  
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Part 3 
‘One month later, the media reports that the illness was salmonella affecting 25 people, but then the 
reports become less frequent and eventually you hear nothing more about it.’ 
Questions and prompts: 
See Group 1 above.  
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Vignette Part 1 presentation and discussion 
Small groups critique the Model in light of 
their strategies 
Small groups map their own strategies to 
those of the Model 
The Model is presented and explained to 
participants 
Model discussion session (afternoon) 
Small groups collate the key strategies and 
rank them in order of importance 
Participants individually identify the key 
strategies for consumer trust during a food 
incident 
Vignette Part 3 presentation and discussion 
Vignette Part 2 presentation and discussion 
Vignette discussion session (morning) 
Figure 1. Study components in chronological order 
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Highlights 
 
• Timely transparency is the key strategy for consumer trust during a food incident.  
• Consumers and food actors propose similar strategies for maintaining consumer trust. 
• Consumers express pessimism regarding food actors’ ability to implement strategies.  
